3rd PQCSM | QSMC

臺灣晶片崁入PQC後量子密碼，創新接軌國際商機

我們所悉知的晶片整合軟硬體方案，不僅是國內產業創新的進步，同時也帶動各型態產業的無數商機與新興科技的應用，例如高科技製造業、工業、關鍵基礎設施、金融、醫療等等，但是對全球而言，資訊安全的威脅攻擊無所不在，且瞬息萬變，令人難以預料，無論來自雲端或是設備端，均有安全風險的憂慮，因此 PQC 後量子密碼的安全機制部署，迫在眉睫，同樣地公開金鑰密碼的標準制定，也將是場重大變革。

如何將臺灣晶片嵌入 PQC 後量子密碼安全機制內，與全球標準規範同步對接，雲地應用彈性且安全，同時創造新興科技接軌國際，擴展市場商機。 8月10日(星期六) 「第三屆 PQCSM 後量子密碼標準化與遷移研討會 - 臺灣晶片崁入 PQC 後量子密碼，創新接軌國際商機」今年夏季，唯一的一場您千萬別錯過。

您將會聽到 :

最新的 PQC 後量子密碼標準的制定
臺灣如何在 2028 前完成後量子密碼遷移
晶片到雲端裝置的生命週期安全保護
Google PQC 遷移的做法與成效
新加坡 PQC 後量子安全遷移的超前部署

Programs

Programs Link

Speakers

Sophie Schmieg

Sr. Staff Cryptography Engineer, Google

Bio：Sophie Schmieg is a cryptography engineer at Google, where she leads the ISE Crypto team. As part of her work in ISE Crypto she is responsible for Google's transition to post-quantum cryptography. Sophie has a PhD in algebraic geometry from the university of Ulm.

Title：PQC at Google

Abstract：In this talk I will present some core concepts and lessons learned around deploying cryptography in general and PQC in particular at Google, with an emphasis on what we can learn for writing future standards around PQC.

Michael Kasper

CEO of Fraunhofer Singapore and Co-coordinator, National Quantum-Safe Network, Associate Professor, Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Director Fraunhofer-NTU Centre FSR@NTU

Bio：At Fraunhofer Singapore, Michael leads an interdisciplinary team with a strong focus on current and upcoming challenges for security, trust, and privacy in emerging technologies. As an expert in information security with more than 20 years of professional experience, his interests are in cyber security, artificial intelligence, and quantum-safe technologies. He is coordinator and principal investigator for the National Quantum-Safe Network (NQSN) established in 2022 by Singapore’s Quantum Engineering Programme. Michael is an Associate Professor at Nanyang Technological University (NTU) and leads the NTU-Fraunhofer-NTU research center. He is adjunct professor at GLOBIS University in Japan. Before coming to Singapore in 2017, Michael co-headed the department Cyber-Physical Systems Security and a joint working group with the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) on constructive side channel attacks and secure design. Currently, he is affiliated with the Fraunhofer Institute for Applied and Integrated Security (AISEC) and Fraunhofer Institute for Electronic Nanosystems (ENAS) in Germany. He was involved in several research activities and consultation for industry and government to utilize cyber and security technologies in real-world applications.

Title：Quantum Resilience and Readiness - From Testbeds to Production Ready Quantum-Safe Networks

Abstract：Practical quantum computing is expected to break the security of nearly all important public-key cryptographic primitives used in today’s digital communication. Although this critical moment is still some years ahead, rapid technological developments underscore the urgent need to address quantum resilience and readiness, and to shift to quantum-safe infrastructures and applications. How can we prepare and protect against quantum risks? What are the challenges in transitioning to quantum-safe networks using Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC), and where do current promises fall short? We will explore how these technologies can team up and complement each other, rather than compete. The keynote will dive into approaches currently taken in Singapore and Germany with its transition from testbeds to production-ready quantum-safe networks in both the public and private sectors.

Matthias J. Kannwischer

Crypto Lab- Research Director

Bio：Dr. Matthias J. Kannwischer is an expert in quantum safe cryptography. He received his PhD in applied post-quantum cryptography from Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands) and was supervised by Peter Schwabe and Bo-Yin Yang. Prior to joining Chelpis Quantum Corp and QSMC, He was a post-doctoral researcher at Academia Sinica (Taipei, Taiwan) and a PhD student at the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy (Bochum, Germany) and Radboud University (Nijmegen, The Netherlands).

He is a co-submitter of UOV and MAYO, and a maintainer of the pqm4 post-quantum software framework.

Title：Secure post-quantum implementations: Avoiding KyberSlash and more

Abstract：With the upcoming standardization of post-quantum primitives, deployment is gaining traction. Several organizations have already started rolling out ML-KEM (formerly known as Kyber) - the NIST-designated standard for post-quantum key agreement.
As most widely deployed cryptographic libraries have yet to add support for ML-KEM, organizations rolling out ML-KEM early, have to either write their own implementations or fall back to other implementations which are often academic prototypes not intended for production use.

This talk covers some common pitfalls when implementing ML-KEM and recently discovered vulnerabilities. In particular, I'll explain the KyberSlash vulnerabilities (https://kyberslash.cr.yp.to/) discovered in late 2023 and present in several popular ML-KEM implementations.

I'll also present our efforts within the Post-Quantum Cryptography Alliance (PQCA) to produce high-quality high-assurance post-quantum implementations.